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This Article analyzes how the Thirteenth Amendment has been used to prevent 
forced labor practices in immigration detention. The Article assesses the effectiveness 
of Thirteenth Amendment litigation by dissecting cases where detainees have 
challenged the legality of labor requirements under the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Act. Given the expansion in immigration detention, the increasing privatization of 
detention, and the significant human rights implications of this issue, the arguments 
advanced in this Article are not only currently relevant but have the potential to 
shape ongoing dialogue on this subject.
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Introduction
Across the country, detainees in the custody of the United States 
Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforce-
ment (“ICE”) allege they are being coerced into performing work with-
out proper compensation, often under the threat of punishment or under 
other forcible conditions.1 The immigrant plaintiffs in one such case—
Menocal v. GEO Group, Inc.—filed a lawsuit alleging violations of federal 
law prohibiting forced labor by the for-profit company managing and 
operating the facility.2 The complaint asserts that detainees were forced 
by GEO Group (“GEO”) to work for either token pay ($1/day) or no 
pay to perform the following range of tasks:
Plaintiffs scrubbed bathrooms, showers, toilets, and windows 
throughout GEO’s Aurora facility. They cleaned and main-
tained GEO’s on-site medical facility, cleaned the medical fa-
cility’s toilets, floors and windows, cleaned patient rooms and 
medical staff offices, swept, mopped, stripped, and waxed the 
floors of the medical facility, did medical facility laundry, 
swept, mopped, stripped, and waxed floors throughout the fa-
cility, did detainee laundry, prepared and served detainee 
meals, assisted in preparing catered meals for law enforcement 
events sponsored by GEO, performed clerical work for GEO, 
prepared clothing for newly arriving detainees, provided bar-
ber services to detainees, ran the facility’s law library, cleaned 
the facility’s intake area and solitary confinement unit, deep 
cleaned and prepared vacant portions of the facility for newly 
1. See Michelle Chen, ICE’s Captive Immigrant Labor Force, NATION (Oct. 11, 2017),
https://www.thenation.com/article/ices-captive-immigrant-labor-force
[https://perma.cc/5BBU-5PCR].
2. See Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 320 F.R.D. 258, 261 (D. Colo. 2017), aff’d, 882 
F.3d 905 (10th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 143, 202 L. Ed. 2d 34 (2018).
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arriving detainees, cleaned the facility’s warehouse, and main-
tained the exterior and landscaping of the GEO building, inter 
alia.3
The detainees in these facilities allege that they were forced to do 
various types of labor, including administrative, janitorial, housekeeping, 
landscaping, and maintenance work. The complaint also alleges that indi-
viduals who refused to work were subject to threats of discipline includ-
ing punishment in solitary confinement if they failed to comply.4 This 
scheme of underpayment or nonpayment “unjustly enriched [the compa-
ny] when it paid its employees $1 per day, or nothing at all, for their la-
bor.”5
This Article seeks to analyze how legislation developed pursuant to 
the Thirteenth Amendment can be used to prevent forced labor in immi-
grant detention settings. In addition to analyzing the effectiveness of these 
legal challenges brought under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act 
(“TVPA”), the Article assesses how these arguments can impact current 
litigation, legislation, and public action across the country.
Given the expansion in immigration detention, the increasing pri-
vatization of detention, and the significant human rights implications of 
this issue, this Article is critical in the current moment and can be used to 
shape ongoing dialogue on this subject. This Article assesses the role that 
Thirteenth Amendment litigation in the immigration detention context 
can play in rectifying inequities at the intersection of race, immigration, 
and labor.
I. Contextualizing the Thirteenth Amendment in the 
Immigration Detention Setting
A. The Immigration Detention Context
In assessing whether the Thirteenth Amendment should be used in 
the immigration detention context, it is key to understand the 
circumstances in which it would be applied and who would be impacted.
The immigrant detainee population is primarily comprised of people of 
color, more of whom are being held in detention and are being detained 
for longer periods of time than ever before.
3. Complaint at 2-3, Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 320 F.R.D. 258, 261 (D. Colo.
filed Oct. 22, 2014) (No. 14-cv-02887).
4. See id. at 3.
5. Id. at 2.
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Immigrants are mostly people of color: the percent of white, non-
Hispanic immigrants has dropped from nearly fifty percent in 1980 to 
under twenty percent in 2018.6 According to Pew Research Center data, 
the top five countries of origin for immigrants to the United States in
2018 were Mexico, China, India, Philippines, and El Salvador.7 Moreo-
ver, per data collected by Freedom for Immigrants, the top countries of 
birth for immigrants in detention are Mexico, El Salvador, Honduras, 
and Guatemala.8 This data reflects the changing demographics of the im-
migrant population.9
The length of immigration detention is also increasing. In some cas-
es, ICE detains immigrants while pursuing deportation.10 Reports from 
the TRAC Immigration Project, which systematically reviews federal 
government data, indicate highly variable lengths of detention among de-
tainees. In 2012, of 1,500 individuals detained, 40 percent had their case 
“dispositions occur[] very quickly, within three days,” and 70 percent 
had their “ICE custody ended during the first month.”11 Short detention 
durations can be attributed to the number of individuals who “did not 
6. Abby Budiman, Christine Tamir, Lauren Mora & Luis Noe-Bustamante, Facts on 
U.S. Immigrants, 2018, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org
/hispanic/2019/06/03/facts-on-u-s-immigrants-trend-data/ [https://perma.cc/2YHH-
HNTS].
7. Abby Budiman, Key Findings About U.S. Immigrants, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/03/key-findings-
about-u-s-immigrants/ [https://perma.cc/D658-2RTT].
8. Detention by the Numbers, FREEDOM FOR IMMIGRANTS, https://www.freedom
forimmigrants.org/detention-statistics [https://perma.cc/VK9B-NHH6] (last visited Sept. 
27, 2020).
9. See id. Data compiled by Freedom for Immigrants, based on “thousands of intakes 
with people in immigration detention,” illustrates that individuals aged 26 to 35 years old 
are the largest age group being detained, followed by 36 to 45 years olds and subsequently 
by individuals under the age of 25.
10. Section 1226(a) of the INA provides that, “pending a decision on whether the al-
ien is to be removed from the” country, “the Attorney General (1) may continue to de-
tain the arrested alien; and (2) may release the alien on (A) bond of at least $1,500 . . . or
(B) conditional parole[.]” 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226 (West 2020). The inability to pay is but one 
factor that might cause an individual to be detained. See Brianna Hill, Issues with Interpreta-
tion, Video-Teleconferencing, and More in Chicago’s Immigration Bond Court, CHI. APPLESEED 
FUND FOR JUSTICE (Feb. 18, 2020), http://www.chicagoappleseed.org/our-
blog/preliminary-findings-immigration-observations/ [https://perma.cc/UA85-BEDX]
(reporting that although “about 30% of detained immigrants were able to secure an im-
migration custody decision that allowed them to be released upon paying bond” in 2018, 
about one-fifth of detainees granted bond “remain in custody until the end of their case, 
most likely because of their inability to pay their bond”).
11. Legal Noncitizens Receive Longest ICE Detention, TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS 
CLEARINGHOUSE: IMMIGRATION (June 3, 2013), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/
reports/321/ [https://perma.cc/8N4Y-SR3D].
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contest their deportation”12 and may “indicat[e] that ICE did not need to 
obtain court approval to deport these individuals.”13 Even in the midst of 
increasingly lengthy detention periods, the American Immigration Coun-
cil found “the average detention length was consistently and substantially 
longer in privately operated facilities” than at those that were publicly-
operated.14
Differences in detention duration are especially evident when mak-
ing state-by-state comparisons. In California, 50 percent of individuals 
“spent less than a day in ICE custody and nearly three quarters spent 
three days or less in lockup.”15 In South Carolina and Alabama, however,
only three percent of immigrants “were detained for three days or less.”16
In states that detain individuals for longer periods of time, each day pre-
sents a new opportunity for unpaid labor to be requested. The population 
of detained immigrants has also increased steadily over the years from ap-
proximately 6,800 in 1994 to 49,500 in early 2019, rising about 625 per-
cent over the last two and a half decades.17 Yet, it seems that even this 
may be a conservative estimate, as other reports suggest the immigration 
population in detention exceeds 55,000, which would be over a 700 per-
cent increase since 1994.18
Reports from within these detention centers often reveal shockingly 
atrocious conditions. The management of these facilities often reflects an 
extreme lack of care,19 resulting in detainees’ inadequate access to medical 
12. Id.
13. Detention by the Numbers, supra note 8; November 2017 ICE Detention Facility Lists,
NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR. (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.scribd.com/document/
373733514/November-2017-ICE-Detention-Facility-Lists#fromembed
[https://perma.cc/5AZE-NFPH].
14. EMILY RYO & IAN PEACOCK, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, THE LANDSCAPE OF 
IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE UNITED STATES 23 (Dec. 2018), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/the_landscape_
of_immigration_detention_in_the_united_states.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3RY-WY2B].
15. Legal Noncitizens Receive Longest ICE Detention, supra note 11.
16. Id.
17. Katie Sullivan & Jeff Mason, Immigration Detention in the United States: A Primer,
BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR. (Apr. 24, 2019), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/
immigration-detention-in-the-united-states-a-primer/ [https://perma.cc/5MFB-3TMV].
18. Isabela Dias, ICE is Detaining More People Than Ever—and for Longer, PACIFIC 
STANDARD (Aug. 1, 2019), https://psmag.com/news/ice-is-detaining-more-people-than-
ever-and-for-longer [https://perma.cc/X7FM-G8UB] (reporting that there were 
“55,185 people in ICE’s custody, which represents a jump of almost 3,000 in comparison 
to just last week (which was already a record)”).
19. See, e.g., Monsy Alvarado, Ashley Balcerzak, Stacey Barchenger, Jon Campbell, 
Rafael Carranza, Maria Clark, Alan Gomez, Daniel Gonzalez, Trevor Hughes, Rick Jer-
vis, Dan Keemahill, Rebecca Plevin, Jeremy Schwartz, Sarah Taddeo, Lauren Villagran, 
Dennis Wagner, Elizabeth Weise & Alissa Zhu, ‘These People Are Profitable’: Under Trump, 
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care,20 sexual abuse,21 and inhumane conditions of detention.22 Yet, the 
government’s lack of basic data tracking,23 penchant for destroying rec-
ords,24 and decreased oversight25 all allow these conditions to persist.
Private Prisons Are Cashing in on ICE Detainees, USA TODAY (Dec. 20, 2019), 
https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/nation/2019/12/19/ice-detention-private-
prisons-expands-under-trump-administration/4393366002/ [https://perma.cc/7XWF-
8C53] (reporting “400 allegations of sexual assault or abuse, inadequate medical care, reg-
ular hunger strikes, frequent use of solitary confinement, more than 800 instances of phys-
ical force against detainees, nearly 20,000 grievances filed by detainees and at least 29 fa-
talities, including seven suicides, since Trump took office in January 2017”); BBC, 
Trump Migrant Separation Policy: Children ‘In Cages’ in Texas (June 18, 2018), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-44518942 [https://perma.cc/X5TV-
28EK]; Caitlin Dickerson, Parents of 545 Children Separated at the Border Cannot Be Found,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/21/us/migrant-
children-separated.html; Rachel Treisman, Whistleblower Alleges ‘Medical Neglect,’ Ques-
tionable Hysterectomies Of ICE Detainees, NPR (Sept. 16, 2020 4:43 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/09/16/913398383/whistleblower-alleges-medical-neglect-
questionable-hysterectomies-of-ice-detaine [https://perma.cc/BX79-3G78] (complaint 
allegations included: performing sterilizations without consent or medical necessity, “re-
fusing to test detainees for COVID-19, shredding medical requests submitted by detained 
immigrants, fabricating medical records, allowing employees to work while symptomatic 
and awaiting COVID-19 test results, withholding information from detainees and em-
ployees about who has tested positive, underreporting COVID-19 cases, and allowing the 
transfer of detained immigrants, including those who have tested positive for the virus”).
20. See, e.g., Hamed Aleaziz, Another Immigrant Has Died in ICE Custody. She’s
The Eighth Since October., BUZZFEED NEWS (Mar. 9, 2020, 7:13 PM), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/hamedaleaziz/immigrant-died-ice-custody-
healthcare-hospital-asylum [https://perma.cc/T679-BCLZ] (reporting death of 22-year-
old Guatemalan woman as “the eighth [fatality] in ICE custody in the 2020 fiscal year, 
which began Oct. 1, and equals the number of deaths for the entire 2019 fiscal year”); 
US: Poor Medical Care, Deaths, in Immigrant Detention, HUMAN RTS. WATCH
(June 20, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/20/us-poor-medical-care-deaths-
immigrant-detention# [https://perma.cc/DHW4-9JW4].
21. See, e.g., Alice Speri, Detained, Then Violated: 1,224 Complaints Reveal a Staggering 
Pattern of Sexual Abuse in Immigration Detention. Half of Those Accused Worked for ICE.,
INTERCEPT (Apr. 11, 2018, 12:11 PM), https://theintercept.com/2018/04/11/
immigration-detention-sexual-abuse-ice-dhs/ [https://perma.cc/57M2-HTEK] (noting 
1,224 complaints from January 2010 to September 2017, but only 43 investigations dur-
ing the same time period; also observing that in nearly 60 percent of cases “an officer or 
private detention contractor [w]as the perpetrator of the alleged abuse” and that one-third 
of complaints assert “an officer either directly witnessed the alleged abuse or was made 
aware of it”).
22. See, e.g., Ellen Gallagher, The Other Problem with ICE Detention: Solitary Confine-
ment, WASH. POST (Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/
08/28/other-problem-with-ice-detention-solitary-confinement/; John Washington, 
The Epidemic of Hunger Strikes in Immigrant Detention Centers, NATION (Feb. 13, 
2020), https://www.thenation.com/article/society/immigrant-detention-hunger-strike/
[https://perma.cc/HN22-8J4R].
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Yet, the expansion of the mass detention system likely comes as
welcome news to the many American companies that profit from it. The 
chief executives of the private companies running these immigration fa-
cilities “speak of ‘improved occupancy rates’ as a perverse benefit of 
[ICE’s] practices, which heavily sweep in undocumented immigrants as 
‘detainees.’”26 DHS Homeland Security Advisory Council reported in 
2016 that 65 percent of the detainee population resides in private facili-
ties, while 25 percent are detained in public facilities like county jails, and 
only 10 percent of detainees reside in federally owned and directed facili-
ties.27 According to data compiled by the Urban Justice Center’s Correc-
23. Associated Press, More than 5,400 Children Split at Border, According to New Count,
NBC NEWS (Oct. 25, 2019, 4:58 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/
more-5-400-children-split-border-according-new-count-n1071791
[https://perma.cc/X3H8-Z4VW] (reporting that 5,400 children separated from their par-
ents at the border, especially the 1,500 admitted between July 2017 to June 2018, were 
“difficult to find because the government had inadequate tracking systems); Jacob 
Soboroff, Emails Show Trump Admin Had ‘No Way to Link’ Separated Migrant Children to 
Parents, NBC NEWS (May 1, 2019, 7:29 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/
immigration/emails-show-trump-admin-had-no-way-link-separated-migrant-n1000746
[https://perma.cc/5A64-PJGG] (citing delays in family reunifications because govern-
ment’s allegedly centralized database system “did not contain enough information to suc-
cessfully reunite parents and kids”).
24. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Scheduled Approved, U.S. NAT’L ARCHIVES:
RECORDS EXPRESS (Dec. 17, 2019), https://records-express.blogs.archives.gov/2019
/12/17/immigration-and-customs-enforcement-scheduled-approved/ [https://perma.cc
/95RU-JCPK] (noting the cache of documents scheduled for destruction included “co-
vers records related to deaths of detainees and allegations of sexual assault and abuse of 
detainees”).
25. Eunice Cho, The Trump Administration Weakens Standards for ICE Detention Facili-
ties, ACLU (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.aclu.org/news/immigrants-rights/the-trump-
administration-weakens-standards-for-ice-detention-facilities/ [https://perma.cc/E2YV-
M3LM] (explaining how new standards weaken protections for immigrants by removing 
critical requirements governing health accreditation, health assessments, and physician su-
pervision; eliminating protections against the use of force and solitary confinement; eradi-
cating standards governing basic needs and human dignity, such that “ICE no longer re-
quires that hold rooms have toilets with modesty panels, and removes the ratios for the 
number of toilets per detainee”; and modifying the requirements for new facilities to no 
longer require outdoor recreation space).
26. Michele Goodwin, The Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery, Capitalism, and Mass 
Incarceration, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 970 (2019).
27. HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
PRIVATIZED IMMIGRATION DETENTION FACILITIES (Dec. 1, 2016), https://immigrant
justice.org/sites/default/files/content-type/press-release/documents/2016-12/
DHS_HSAC_PIDF_Report-FINAL_DRAFT.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FBC-W5FF]; see 
also Mike Ludwig, Big Banks Are Divesting From Private Prisons, Thanks to Anti-ICE Activ-
ism, SLUDGE (July 24, 2019, 11:44 AM), https://readsludge.com/2019/07/24/big-banks-
are-divesting-from-private-prisons-thanks-to-anti-ice-activism/ [https://perma.cc/N8L3-
RWGN] (reporting that the National Immigrant Justice Center estimates that “71 percent 
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tions Accountability Project in 2019, as many as 72 percent of immigrant 
detainees are held in privately owned facilities.28 As a result, “ICE spends 
more than $2 billion a year on immigrant detention through private 
jails.”29 The two largest detention companies—GEO Group and Core-
Civic, formerly Corrections Corporation of America—earned a com-
bined $985 million from contracts with ICE in 2017.30
This business is only expanding, as are the earnings. The staggering 
increase in immigration detention, both in terms of total numbers and 
length of confinement, perpetuates the “profit-driven incentivization for 
mass incarceration of immigrants.”31 These companies are planning and 
constructing additional detention facilities32 while detained individuals 
and advocacy groups continue to make allegations regarding the poor 
quality of care in these facilities.33
Privatization also shields operators from scrutiny because “detention 
contractors are not subject to federal open records laws, civil service re-
quirements, administrative law, constitutional requirements, and other 
legal checks that would otherwise apply to federal officials doing the same 
work.”34 ICE is responsible for monitoring private facilities to ensure that 
they meet detention standards. The Inspector General of the Department 
of people in ICE custody were held at private facilities in 2017” as opposed to “only 8.5 
percent of state and federal prisoners are held in private jails and prisons”).
28. Immigration Detention: An American Business, WORTH RISES, [hereinafter Worth 
Rises] https://worthrises.org/immigration [https://perma.cc/GP8A-L9AY] (last visited 
Sept. 26, 2020).
29. John Burnett, Big Money as Private Immigrant Jails Boom, NPR (Nov. 21, 2017, 5:00 
AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/11/21/565318778/big-money-as-private-immigrant-
jails-boom [https://perma.cc/TX5A-7UHK].
30. Worth Rises, supra note 28.
31. Tanvi Misra, Emails Show How Private Firms Profit from ICE Detention Centers, ROLL 
CALL (Sept. 26, 2019, 10:09 AM), https://www.rollcall.com/news/policy/emails-show-
how-private-firms-profit-from-ice-detention-centers [https://perma.cc/G36U-FCPH] 
(reporting that Immigration Centers of America was awaiting payment “for at least $1.8 
million in February for running operations at the Farmville facility, which has around 700 
beds” and “that ICE pays $120 per day for each person held at Farmville, and an addi-
tional $28 per person when the total number of detainees exceeds 500”).
32. Nuria Marquez Martinez, ICE Is Rushing to Open For-Profit Detention Centers—
Right Before California’s Ban Goes Into Effect, Mother Jones (Oct. 29, 2019), 
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/10/ice-california-new-detention-facilities-
private-profit/ [https://perma.cc/U4DT-48RA].
33. See Gaby Del Valle, ICE Has Been Ramping Up Its Work with a Private Prison 




34. David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Privatized Detention & Immigration 
Federalism, 71 STAN. L. REV. Online 224, 226 (2019).
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of Homeland Security (“DHS”) reported that ICE has failed to “ensure 
adequate oversight” for these facilities, leaving some issues “unaddressed 
for years.”35 When coupled with destructive public commentary that de-
humanizes the individuals who are detained, these circumstances are like-
ly to worsen detention conditions and result in further constitutional vio-
lations.36
B. The Civil-Criminal Distinction
There are many similarities between the immigration and criminal 
detention settings, including poor conditions, gross lack of oversight, and
systemic underfunding of detainee services.37 However, the most salient 
parallels are the staggering racial disparities within these systems and the 
35. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., ICE’S INSPECTIONS AND 
MONITORING OF DETENTION FACILITIES DO NOT LEAD TO SUSTAINED COMPLIANCE 
OR SYSTEMIC IMPROVEMENTS (June 26, 2018), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/assets/2018-06/OIG-18-67-Jun18.pdf [https://perma.cc/ET5L-5PFP].
36. See John Fritze, Trump Used Words Like ‘Invasion’ and ‘Killer’ to Discuss Immigrants at 
Rallies 500 Times, USA TODAY (Aug. 8, 2019, 4:46 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/politics/elections/2019/08/08/trump-immigrants-rhetoric-criticized-el-paso-
dayton-shootings/1936742001/ [https://perma.cc/5MFJ-YVPE] (documenting that an 
“analysis of the 64 rallies Trump has held since 2017 found that, when discussing immi-
gration, the president has said ‘invasion’ at least 19 times. He has used the word ‘animal’
34 times and the word ‘killer’ nearly three dozen times”); see also Tess Bonn, Trump’s Im-
migration Rhetoric Has ‘Chilling Effect’ on Families, Says Children’s Advocacy Group Director,
HILL (Dec. 20, 2018), https://thehill.com/hilltv/rising/422371-childrens-advocacy-
group-director-says-trumps-immigration-rhetoric-has-chilling [https://perma.cc/D9WA-
UVDP]; see also Philip Rucker, ‘How Do You Stop These People?’: Trump’s




37. See, e.g., Muzaffar Chishti & Jessica Bolter, As #DefundThePolice Movement Gains 
Steam, Immigration Enforcement Spending and Practices Attract Scrutiny, MIGRATION POL’Y
INST. (June 25, 2020), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/defundthepolice-
movement-gains-steam-immigration-enforcement-spending-and-practices-attract
[https://perma.cc/46NB-XVRE]; Stacy Brustin, I Toured an Immigration Detention Center. 
The Prison-like Atmosphere Was Mind-numbing., USA TODAY (May 16, 2019, 4:00 AM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/voices/2019/05/16/ice-immigration-
detention-center-like-prison-otero-column/1190633001/ [https://perma.cc/NMB2-
SYLW]; Claire Brown, ICE Detainees Are Supposed to Get Three Square Meals a Day—But 
They Don’t, FOOD JUSTICE (Aug. 24, 2018), https://civileats.com/2018/08/24/ice-
detainees-are-supposed-to-get-three-square-meals-a-day-but-they-dont/ 
[https://perma.cc/6FZR-LEMS]; John W. Schoen & Chloe Aiello, ICE Overspends Tax 
Dollars on a Detention Policy Many Americans Find Abhorrent, CNBC (June 22, 2018, 12:04 
PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/22/ice-overspends-tax-dollars-on-a-detention-
policy-many-americans-find-abhorrent.html [https://perma.cc/P9A8-MWUL].
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increasing trend toward privatization. Despite the many commonalities, 
the applicability of the Thirteenth Amendment is determined by one vital 
difference between these detention contexts.
Like the immigrant detention system, the prison population is “dis-
proportionately men and women of color.”38 People of color are 
overrepresented in detention39 for several reasons, including the criminal-
ization of poverty,40 the over-policing of communities of color,41 and the 
historical vestiges of discrimination that have become institutionalized in 
our criminal legal system.42 This has given rise to “a prison system that 
incarcerates black people at more than five times the rate of white peo-
ple.”43
38. Goodwin, supra note 26, at 971.
39. Compare Inmate Race, U.S. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/
statistics/statistics_inmate_race.jsp [https://perma.cc/PK59-3MBZ] (last visited Apr. 5, 
2020) (providing statistics on incarceration rates), with Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045218 [https://perma.cc/3ZJ3-
AEXW] (last visited Apr. 5, 2020) (despite comprising only 13.4 percent of the popula-
tion, Black people represent 37.5 percent of those detained in federal prisons; Native 
Americans are also overrepresented, constituting 2.3 percent of detained individuals but 
only 1.3 percent of the general population; data on Hispanic/Latinos not provided).
40. Jeff Yungman, The Criminalization of Poverty, AM. BAR ASS’N (2019), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/gpsolo/publications/gp_solo/2019/january-
february/criminalization-poverty/ [https://perma.cc/Y9NB-C92D] (finding that “[p]oor 
people, especially people of color, face a greater risk of being fined, arrested, and even 
incarcerated for minor offenses . . . [such as] [a] broken taillight, an unpaid parking ticket, 
a minor drug offense, sitting on a sidewalk, or sleeping in a park”) (referencing KAREN 
DOLAN, INST. FOR POL’Y STUD., THE POOR GET PRISON: THE ALARMING SPREAD OF 
THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY).
41. See, e.g., Alexi Jones, Police Stops Are Still Marred by Racial Discrimination, New Data 
Shows, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/
2018/10/12/policing/ [https://perma.cc/VHJ7-SBS3] (noting “Black residents were 
more likely to be stopped by police than white or Hispanic residents, both in traffic stops 
and street stops” and that “[p]olice are twice as likely to use force against people of col-
or”); Danyelle Solomon, The Intersection of Policing and Race, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
(Sept. 1, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/reports/2016/
09/01/143357/the-intersection-of-policing-and-race/ [https://perma.cc/229T-UMFZ];
Shaun King, Communities of Color are Massively Over-policed — Effectively Criminalizing Col-
or Itself, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 7, 2016, 4:37 PM), https://www.nydailynews.com/
news/national/communities-color-massively-over-policed-article-1.2741945
[https://perma.cc/5NW5-98WF].
42. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2011).
43. Becky Little, Does an Exception Clause in the 13th Amendment Still Permit Slavery?,
HISTORY.COM (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.history.com/news/13th-amendment-
slavery-loophole-jim-crow-prisons [https://perma.cc/CC8V-S2AY]; see also Criminal
Justice Fact Sheet, NAACP, https://www.naacp.org/criminal-justice-fact-sheet/
[https://perma.cc/3ALC-LESZ] (last visited Sept. 22, 2020).
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The second notable similarity to the immigration detention context 
is the rapid increase of the privatization of prisons, especially since the 
start of “the Trump Administration, [when] private prison companies 
have expanded their reach and consolidated their market share.”44 The 
U.S. Department of Justice has acknowledged that “between 1980 and 
2013, the federal prison population increased by almost 800 percent,”
such that private prisons have profited from this expansion.45
As a result of these trends, laborers in prison are predominantly 
people of color and are increasingly under the control of private compa-
nies that run these detention facilities. However, the Thirteenth 
Amendment exempts “punishment for crime whereof the party shall 
have been duly convicted” from its scope of protection.46 Accordingly, 
“prison labor practices, from chain gangs to prison laundries, do not run 
afoul of the Thirteenth Amendment.”47 Those confined within the jail or 
prison system pursuant to a criminal conviction are part of the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s loophole.48 These individuals’ labor is either unpaid or un-
derpaid.49 This has been permitted for years, despite arguments advocat-
44. Goodwin, supra note 26, at 970 (citing Ciara O’Neill, Private Prisons: Principally 
Profit-Oriented and Politically Pliable, FOLLOW THE MONEY (June 7, 2018), 
https://www.followthemoney.org/research/institute-reports/private-prisons-principally-
profit-oriented-and-politically-pliable [https://perma.cc/B9MW-3QM3]).
45. Id. at 971 (citing Memorandum from Sally Yates, Deputy Attorney General, on 
Reducing Our Use of Private Prisons (Aug. 18. 2016), https://www.justice.gov
/archives/opa/file/886311/download [https://perma.cc/NTQ9-AZF4]).
46. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; but see James Gray Pope, Mass Incarceration, Convict Leas-
ing, and the Thirteenth Amendment: A Revisionist View, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1465 (July 23, 
2019) (Although beyond the scope of this Article, at least one scholar contends that—
notwithstanding the Punishment Clause—convicted persons retain Thirteenth Amend-
ment protection against any slavery or involuntary servitude that has not been inflicted “as
punishment” for the particular crime of which they “have been duly convicted.” If that 
argument holds true, then the Amendment shields persons who are incarcerated not only 
against compulsory labor, but also against any badge or incident of slavery that has not 
been imposed as part of the individual’s sentence.).
47. Jamal Greene & Jennifer Mason McAward, Common Interpretation: The Thirteenth 
Amendment, NAT’L CONST. CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution
/interpretation/amendment-xiii/interps/137 [https://perma.cc/SN24-KK58] (last visited 
Sept. 22, 2020).
48. Little, supra note 43.
49. Wendy Sawyer, How Much Do Incarcerated People Earn in Each State?, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/04/10/wages/
[https://perma.cc/V7AS-EMGU] (noting several states where “regular prison jobs are still 
unpaid in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, and Texas”; reviewing wages for regular, 
non-industry jobs: where lowest pay is $0 and highest pay is $2.00, and jobs in state-
owned businesses or “correctional industries,” where lowest pay is $0 and highest pay is 
$5.15).
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ing for improving the pay of incarcerated laborers.50 Ultimately, those 
who are criminally detained are exempt from the Thirteenth Amend-
ment and subject to a form of modern-day slavery.51
By contrast, immigration detention is civil in nature.52 Although 
some immigration offenses such as unlawful re-entry are criminal offenses 
with criminal penalties, many immigration violations are civil in nature.53
Federal law recognizes this civil-criminal distinction in the immigration 
context. For instance, physical presence in the United States without 
proper authorization, such as overstaying a visa, is a civil—but not crimi-
nal—offense.54 As such, the civil nature of immigration detention is im-
portant to note given the Thirteenth Amendment’s criminal detention 
exemption.
Thus, despite the many similarities between the individuals detained 
by the criminal legal and the immigration detention systems—including 
being subject to complete control in a confined setting within a system 
that has a disparate impact on communities of color—the fundamental 
distinction between the criminal versus civil nature of the detention im-
pacts the applicability of the Thirteenth Amendment’s protections. As a 
50. U.S. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., PRISONER LABOR: PERSPECTIVES ON PAYING 
THE FEDERAL MINIMUM WAGE (May 20, 1993), https://www.gao.gov/assets
/220/217999.pdf [https://perma.cc/JRC6-97W7]. The Government Accountability Of-
fice (GAO) report found in 1993 that “inmates are not paid or are paid at rates that are 
substantially less than the federal minimum wage,” “prison systems would have a substan-
tial increase in costs if they were required to pay inmate workers the minimum wage,”
and that “some organizations generally favored improving inmate work programs and in-
mate pay through greater use of prison industry programs, and believed that prison indus-
tries gain an unfair competitive advantage by not paying inmates minimum wages.” Id. at 
4, 6, 10.
51. See Lindsey Bever & Cleve R. Wootson Jr., Inmates Across the U.S. Are Staging a 
Prison Strike over ‘Modern-day Slavery’, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2018, 5:53 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2018/08/21/inmates-across-us-are-staging-
prison-strike-over-modern-day-slavery/ [https://perma.cc/FDW9-6R5P]; see also Jen-
nifer Safstrom & Claire G. Gastañaga, Virginia Must Stop Exploiting People in Prison, 
Wash. Post (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/local-opinions
/virginia-must-stop-exploiting-people-in-prison/2020/04/23/e6516ff8-790e-11ea-b6ff-
597f170df8f8_story.html.
52. Sullivan & Mason, supra note 17 (“Immigration detention is the practice of holding 
individuals in government custody for immigration violations, such as illegal entry or visa 
overstay, during their removal proceedings. Notably, to remain in the United States 
without authorization is an administrative violation of the law. For this reason, immigra-
tion detention is civil in nature and therefore distinct from criminal incarceration.”).
53. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).
54. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1227; see also Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1213 
(2018) (Kagan, J., plurality opinion) (holding, in the context of 8 U.S.C. § 1227, that 
“[t]he removal of an alien is a civil matter”); Id. at 1231 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (agree-
ing about the civil context).
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result, though in many ways similarly situated in terms of confinement 
and vulnerability, those in the immigration detention are entitled to pro-
tections against forced labor that individuals who are incarcerated do not
receive.55
C. History and Legal Context of the Thirteenth Amendment and 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act
While the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery upon its ratifi-
cation in 1865, the Amendment continues to serve an important function 
in preventing labor abuses.56 The Amendment declares that “[n]either 
slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States, 
or any place subject to their jurisdiction,”57 and “is enforceable against 
private parties in the absence of state action.”58 Its expansiveness is neither 
limited in its geographic reach nor in who is required to comply with the 
prohibition; it is an unqualified denunciation of the conditions of forced 
labor “and not a declaration in favor of a particular people” such that the 
Amendment “reaches every race and every individual.”59 The Thirteenth 
Amendment, like most provisions of the Constitution, applies to non-
citizens, who are guaranteed “many of the basic rights, such as the free-
dom of religion and speech, the right to due process and equal protection 
under the law” by virtue of their personhood and presence in the United 
States, not their citizenship status.60
Moreover, under Section 2, Congress has the “power to enforce 
this article by appropriate legislation.”61 This provision permits Congress 
to legislate against the “badges and incidents of slavery” that violate the 
Amendment.62 The expansive nature of the Thirteenth Amendment and 
55. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
56. 45 AM. JUR. 2D Involuntary Servitude § 12 (2020).
57. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
58. 45 AM. JUR. 2D Involuntary Servitude § 12 (2020).
59. Id.
60. Gretchen Frazee, What Constitutional Rights Do Undocumented Immigrants Have?,
PBS (June 25, 2018, 5:08 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/
what-constitutional-rights-do-undocumented-immigrants-have [https://perma.cc/DC64-
H8WV].
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
62. Greene & McAward, supra note 47 (providing examples of congressional legisla-
tion: “the Anti-Peonage Act of 1867 prohibits peonage, and another federal law, 18 
U.S.C. § 1592, makes it a crime to take somebody’s passport or other official documents 
for the purpose of holding her as a slave”; “Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate 
Crimes Prevention Act of 2009 (which criminalizes race-based hate crimes) and the Traf-
ficking Victims Protection Act (which penalizes human trafficking and protects its survi-
vors).”).
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the laws pursuant to Section 2 “are grounded in the view that slavery was 
not just the holding of black Americans to unpaid service, but an entire 
system of social relations designed to enforce a racial hierarchy . . . [and 
that] [t]hese practices denied the equal citizenship status, and implicitly 
the humanity, of African Americans.”63 Thus, it is no surprise that the 
Thirteenth Amendment ban on slavery and involuntary servitude en-
compasses “a broad[] range of labor arrangements where a person is 
forced to work by the use or threatened use of physical or legal coer-
cion.”64 This includes not only situations in which a “servant believes that 
he or she has no viable alternative but to perform service for the master 
because of the master’s use or threatened use of physical force, such as 
where there is repeated use and threats to use physical force,” but also 
those means where “the law, legal process, or legal institutions [are used] 
to compel service.”65
II. Litigation in the Immigration Detention Context
The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution—the Reconstruction Amendments—are animated by twin 
purposes: inclusion and equality. These amendments—banning slavery, 
extending citizenship, and safeguarding voting—were ratified in the wake 
of the Civil War in an effort to establish equality for Black Americans 
with the goal of ensuring full societal participation and political represen-
tation. “The Reconstruction Amendments were the first to include sepa-
rate, express authorization for Congress to enforce their substantive 
commands” and “were the first amendments to the U.S. Constitution to 
enlarge federal power.”66
The Thirteenth Amendment has been applied in the modern con-
text against forced labor practices. Pursuant to its authority under Section 
2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress passed 18 U.S.C. § 1589 as 
part of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act to broaden the definition 
of the types of coercion that could intimidate or pressure an individual 
63. Jamal Greene, Matters of Debate: The Thirteenth Amendment and the Constitutional 
Imagination, NAT’L CONST. CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/
interpretation/amendment-xiii/interps/137#the-thirteenth-amendment-today-jamal-
greene [https://perma.cc/TB62-25HA] (last visited Sept. 23, 2020).
64. Greene & McAward, supra note 47 (noting that “the Thirteenth Amendment bans 
peonage, which occurs when a person is compelled to work to pay off a debt” and that 
would trap individuals “in a cycle of work-without-pay” that the Supreme Court held 
unconstitutional in Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911)).
65. 45 AM. JUR. 2D Involuntary Servitude § 6 (citing U.S. v. King, 840 F.2d 1276 (6th 
Cir. 1988); U.S. v. Alzanki, 54 F.3d 994 (1st Cir. 1995)).
66. Christopher Bryant, The Pursuit of Perfection: Congressional Power to Enforce the Recon-
struction Amendments, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 579, 596 (2010).
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into forced labor. This expanded definition developed “in response to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 
(1988), which interpreted § 1584 to require the use or threatened use of 
physical or legal coercion,” encompasses types of conduct that might re-
sult in forced labor.67 Section 1589 prohibits:
[O]btain[ing] labor or services . . .
(1) by means of force, threats of force, physical restraint, or 
threats of physical restraint to that person or another person;
(2) by means of serious harm or threats of serious harm to that 
person or another person;
(3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal 
process; or
(4) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause 
the person to believe that, if that person did not perform such 
labor or services, that person or another person would suffer 
serious harm or physical restraint.68
Those who violate the § 1589 forced labor provision “shall be fined 
under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.”69
Code provision 18 U.S.C.A. § 1595 provides a civil cause of action 
for enforcement of any violation of this chapter, including § 1589. This 
subjects any individual who perpetrates a violation or who “knowingly 
benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from participation 
in a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged 
in an act in violation of this chapter” to liability “in an appropriate dis-
trict court of the United States” for “damages and reasonable attorneys 
fees.”70
Advocates have filed lawsuits to remedy forced labor violations oc-
curring in the immigration detention context pursuant to this provision.71
67. Involuntary Servitude, Forced Labor, and Sex Trafficking Statutes Enforced, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/crt/involuntary-servitude-forced-labor-and-sex-
trafficking-statutes-enforced [https://perma.cc/5BGS-RWGG] (last updated Aug. 6, 
2015).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 1589.
69. Id.
70. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1595.
71. See, e.g., Laura D. Francis, $1-a-Day Work Program for Immigrant Detainees Heads to 
Trial, BLOOMBERG LAW: DAILY LABOR REPORT (Aug. 7, 2019, 5:12 PM), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/geo-group-must-face-lawsuit-over-
1-a-day-immigrant-detainee-pay [https://perma.cc/7DG5-AYWA]; Tess Owen, De-
tained Immigrants Suing a Private Prison Company over Forced Labor Move Forward with 
Groundbreaking Class Action, VICE (Feb. 28, 2017, 9:18 AM), https://www.vice.com/
en_us/article/paz5qb/detained-immigrants-suing-a-private-prison-company-over-forced-
labor-move-forward-with-groundbreaking-class-action [https://perma.cc/JK2C-3G7M].
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Some courts have found § 1589 to be a constitutional exercise of con-
gressional authority under the Thirteenth Amendment’s broad enforce-
ment power and command to enact “appropriate legislation,” while oth-
ers have held this implicitly in applying the statute.72 This section 
compares the analysis and reasoning relied upon by various courts in as-
sessing arguments pursuant to § 1589 as a mechanism for implementing 
the Thirteenth Amendment’s promise against slavery and indentured ser-
vitude, including its modern manifestation in the immigration context.73
A. Textual Analysis
In Menocal v. GEO Group, plaintiffs Alejandro Menocal, Marcos 
Brambila, Grisel Xahuentitla, Hugo Hernandez, Lourdes Argueta, Jesus 
Gaytan, Olga Alexaklina, Dagoberto Vizguerra, and Demetrio Valerga 
filed a class claim on behalf of current and former detainees of the Aurora 
Detention Facility, a private immigration detention center owned and 
operated by the GEO Group, Inc.74 In this suit, detainees challenged 
both GEO’s “Housing Unit Sanitation Policy, which required all detain-
ees to clean their common living areas[,] and the Voluntary Work Pro-
gram, which compensated detainees $1 a day for performing various 
jobs.”75 Under the sanitation policy’s “disciplinary system, detainees who 
refused to perform their cleaning assignments faced a range of possible 
sanctions, including: (1) the initiation of criminal proceedings, (2) disci-
plinary segregation—or solitary confinement—up to 72 hours, (3) loss of 
commissary, (4) loss of job, (5) restriction to housing unit, (6) reprimand, 
or (7) warning.”76
Complainants asserted they were “forced . . . to clean the [housing 
units] for no pay and under threat of solitary confinement as punishment 
for any refusal to work.”77 Those participating in the Voluntary Work 
Program allege they worked up to eight hours a day “serving food, clean-
ing the facilities, doing laundry, and stripping and waxing floors” for only 
$1 in compensation.78
72. United States v. Garcia, No. 02-CR-110S-01, 2003 WL 22938040, at *3 
(W.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2003); see also United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258 (2010) (finding 
error in the applied standard of review, but raising no issues regarding 1589’s underlying 
legitimacy or Congress’ authority to enact such a provision).
73. This Article does not address the retroactivity of TVPA’s provisions.
74. Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 320 F.R.D. 258, 261 (D. Colo. 2017).
75. Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 882 F.3d 905, 910-11 (10th Cir. 2018).
76. Id. at 911.
77. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
78. Id.
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The Menocal plaintiffs’ argument rests on the plain text of the 
TVPA, which prohibits “knowingly provid[ing] or obtain[ing] the labor 
or services of a person by . . . means of force, threats of force, physical 
restraint, or threats of physical restrain.”79 The threat or means of force 
“reaches any type of forced labor.”80 In response, GEO cited U.S. v. 
Kozminski, a 1988 Supreme Court case that held “§ 1584 reaches only 
compulsion of services by use of physical or legal, as opposed to psycho-
logical, coercion.”81 GEO also relied on Channer v. Hall, a case from the 
Fifth Circuit, which “held that an immigration detainee forced to work 
in the kitchen under threat of solitary confinement was not subjected to 
involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.”82 Alt-
hough the language at issue in Kozminski and Channer appear in the same 
title, the court held the “language at issue here [in § 1589] is thus broad-
er . . . and intentionally so.”83 The text of § 1589 of the TVPA, passed in 
its current iteration in 2008, was not constrained by the text or prior in-
terpretations of different language reflected in § 1584, as the defendant
detention center suggested. Moreover, the court determined that the leg-
islative history of the provisions required a reading consistent with those 
put forth by Menocal and the other then-putative class representatives.84
Thus, the court refused to dismiss the claim.85
The plaintiffs and the court in Owino v. CoreCivic, Inc. relied on the 
same textual argument in Menocal. Plaintiffs Sylvester Owino and Jona-
than Gomez were incarcerated at the Otay Mesa Detention Center facili-
ty where “they and other detainees performed a variety of tasks for De-
fendant ranging from scrubb[ing] bathrooms, showers, toilets, and 
windows to provid[ing] barber services to detainees to perform[ing] cleri-
cal work for CoreCivic” for $1 a day.86 In Owino, “Plaintiffs respond[ed] 
that the plain text of the TVPA, including section 1589, proscribes any 
kind of forced labor even if that labor does not rise to the level of invol-
untary servitude as defined prior to enactment of the TVPA . . . [because] 
the plain meaning of the TVPA is broad enough to encompass their 
claims.”87 The court in Owino found that the statutory language is unam-
79. Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1132 (D. Colo. 2015).
80. Id. (citing Nunag-Tanedo v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 790 F.Supp.2d 
1134 (C.D. Cal. 2011) and U.S. v. Kaufman, 546 F.3d 1242, 1263 (10th Cir. 2008)).
81. Id. (citing U.S. v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 93 (1988)).
82. Id. (citing Channer v. Hall, 112 F.3d 214, 219 (5th Cir.1997)).
83. Id. at 1133.
84. See infra Part III.B.
85. Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1133 (D. Colo. 2015).
86. Owino v. CoreCivic, Inc., No. 17-CV-1112 JLS (NLS), 2018 WL 2193644, at *1 
(S.D. Cal. May 14, 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. Id. at *4.
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biguous because “[t]he statute’s express terms do not limit who consti-
tutes a victim of forced labor” and the provision “applies to any ‘per-
son’—there is no limitation on the type or status of said person.”88 How-
ever, the defendant asserted that they were not subject to the forced labor 
provision because there were no “trafficking” violations under the 
TVPA. The court dismissed this argument, finding that “the statute [does 
not] contain any language limiting application to those who traffic in per-
sons or transport persons across national borders.”89 The Owino court also 
acknowledged that the term “labor or services” was left undefined by the 
statute and, relying on Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 
found the term’s ordinary meaning to include any “expenditure of physi-
cal or mental effort esp[ecially] when fatiguing, difficult, or compulsory”
or “the performance of work commanded or paid for by another.”90 As 
such, the allegations that “detainees cleaned, maintained, scrubbed, 
swept, and mopped floors, bathrooms, showers, toilets, and windows . . .
are clearly within the definition of labor or service.”91 The court also 
acknowledged that threats of solitary confinement, the harm alleged by 
plaintiffs, was sufficient because “solitary confinement bears ‘a further ter-
ror and peculiar mark of infamy’” that even “the threat of solitary con-
finement, sufficiently alleges the means to achieve forced labor.”92
The Owino case guided the development of Gonzalez v. CoreCivic, 
Inc., a related matter in which plaintiffs Carlos Gonzalez, Juan Jose Meri-
no-Rodas, Maribel Gutierrez-Canchola, Gladys Carrera-Duarte, and 
Jennye Pagoada-Lopez (“Gonzalez Plaintiffs”) sought to consolidate their 
case with Owino’s.93 These plaintiffs, like the complainants in Owino, “are 
former civil immigration detainees housed at Defendant’s Otay Mesa fa-
cility . . . [who] allege[d] that they received $1 or $1.50 a day for their 
labor at the detention facility” under threat of solitary confinement or 
loss of privileges.94 The court denied the motion to consolidate and 
stayed the Gonzalez case “until it rules on class certification (or other dis-
positive motions, such as a motion to dismiss with prejudice) in Owino.”95
In another case, plaintiffs Wilhen Barrientos, Margarito Velazquez-
Galicia, and Shoaib Ahmed sued CoreCivic for “forc[ing] detainees to 
work through threats of physical violence, solitary confinement, and dep-
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at *10.
91. Id.
92. Id. at *11.
93. Gonzalez v. CoreCivic, Inc., No. 17-CV-2573 JLS (NLS), 2018 WL 1621543, at 
*1 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2018).
94. Id. at *1, *3.
95. Id. at *6.
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rivation of basic necessities” at the Stewart Detention Center in Geor-
gia.96 In August 2018, Barrientos and the other class members survived a 
motion to dismiss.97 The district court in Georgia was not swayed by 
CoreCivic’s argument that the “TVPA is intended to apply narrowly to 
forced labor in the human trafficking context” and that applying the 
TVPA “to detainee work programs is ‘absurd’ and contrary to the inten-
tions of Congress.”98 The court found such an interpretation “ignores the 
plain language of the statute” and “misunderstands ‘the absurdity doc-
trine,’ which is a narrow exception to the fundamental principle that 
statutory interpretation must be anchored to the plain language of the 
statute.”99 Consistent with the reasoning of other courts, the Barrientos 
court held that the plain reading of § 1589 indicates that “Congress 
placed no such restriction in the statute but chose instead to broadly pro-
hibit ‘whoever’ from ‘obtain[ing] labor’ by any of the proscribed 
means.”100 Thus, while the “lawful force necessary to detain the detainees 
cannot be the source for the TVPA claims,” individuals “cannot be 
forced into labor in violation of the TVPA.”101 The defendant sought to 
persevere under the absurdity doctrine, contending that deviation from 
the ordinary sense of the words is appropriate because otherwise the pur-
ported interpretation “would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance 
or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument.”102 The court here readi-
ly dismissed the applicability of the absurdity doctrine, noting that this 
canon does not provide license for “judicial revision of public and private 
texts to make them (in the judge’s view) more reasonable.”103 Because 
“CoreCivic points to no particular word or phrase in the TVPA that it 
claims must be corrected” and “relies upon no language in the statute for 
this broad assertion,” the court declined to “re-draft” the statute to align 
with CoreCivic’s reading simply because the company “may find it ab-
surd that Congress drafted the TVPA in such a way that it theoretically 
reaches the conduct alleged here.”104
The lower court’s denial of defendant CoreCivic’s motion to dis-
miss was affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit, allowing the plaintiffs’ case to 
proceed, by finding that “the TVPA applies to private for-profit contrac-
96. Barrientos v. CoreCivic, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 3d 1305, 1307 (M.D. Ga. 2018).
97. Id.





103. Id. at 1310-11 (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:
THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 237 (2012)).
104. Id. at 1311.
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tors operating federal immigration detention facilities.”105 The panel’s 
holding, like the district court, found the TVPA’s “clear and unambigu-
ous language . . . limits liability only by reference to the actions taken by 
a would-be violator” and “applies to anyone who knowingly obtains the 
labor or services of a person through one of the four illegal coercive 
means explicitly listed in the statute,” with “[n]o other limiting princi-
ple” in the plain text of the statute.106
The federal district court in Texas rejected CoreCivic’s motion to 
dismiss a TVPA claim pursuant to § 1589 in Gonzalez v. CoreCivic, Inc.,
arising out of complaints levied by Martha Gonzalez and those similarly 
situated at the Laredo Detention Center.107 During her confinement, 
“Gonzalez contends that . . . she was paid only $1 or $1.50 per day to 
clean pods, work in the kitchen, sort laundry, and perform other duties 
under threat of punishment, including but not limited to lockdown and 
solitary confinement.”108 Similar to the claims of other immigrant detain-
ees, Gonzalez alleges that those who refused to work were threatened by 
CoreCivic “with confinement, physical restraint, substantial and sustained 
restrictions, deprivation, violation of their liberty, and solitary confine-
ment, including the denial or delay of hygiene products.”109 As a result, 
immigrants at the facility “performed labor for no pay or at a rate of 
compensation of $1.00 to $2.00 per day for work performed.”110 Here, 
too, the court found that “CoreCivic’s argument fails to identify any am-
biguity in the language or exceptional circumstances to depart from the 
plain language of the statute” and, given that “[t]here is no ambiguity in 
section 1589,” refused to “read congressional findings into the statute.”111
As in Owino, the court here also found “that solitary confinement, or the 
threat of solitary confinement, sufficiently alleges the means to achieve 
forced labor, and the court therefore concludes that Gonzalez has suffi-
ciently stated a claim for a TVPA violation sufficient to overcome the 
motion to dismiss.”112
Although the Central District of California agreed in Novoa v. GEO 
Group that § 1589 applies to immigrant detainees, the court found the al-
legations lacked specificity to state a plausible pattern/practice claim. The 
105. Barrientos v. CoreCivic, Inc., 951 F.3d 1269, 1280 (11th Cir. 2020).
106. Id. at 1276-77.
107. Gonzalez v. CoreCivic, Inc., No. 1:18-CV-169-LY, 2019 WL 2572540, at *1 
(W.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2019).
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court recognized that the text and scope of the TVPA applied to the de-
fendants, holding that “[t]he plain language of § 1589 holds no limitation 
on who it applies to; indeed, subdivision (a) begins ‘whoever.’”113 The
court heard the case of Raul Novoa, who filed a putative class action on 
behalf of himself and other similarly situated detainees. Novoa worked as 
a janitor and barber through the Voluntary Work Program over the 
course of the three years he was detained at the Adelanto facility.114 In his 
complaint, Novoa alleges that as a janitor he “worked four-hour shifts, 
up to seven days per week” and as a barber for “up to ten hours per day, 
seven days a week.”115 Novoa asserted that he spent his earnings on 
“food, bottled water, and hygiene products . . . among other necessities”
and was threatened with “solitary confinement if he stopped working or 
encouraged other detainees to stop working.”116
Despite these assertions, the court ultimately concluded that “Plain-
tiff fails to provide more than conclusory assertions in support of his 
TVPA claim.”117 Though Novoa “alleged a scheme involving GEO 
withholding necessities for detainees and officer threats of solitary con-
finement or criminal prosecution for refusing to work, Plaintiff does not 
sufficiently substantiate these allegations” because he failed to “describe[] 
when he was threatened or who threatened him” or “allege any addi-
tional information about the withheld necessities to make his allegations 
more than conclusory assertions.”118 The court acknowledged that a 
forced labor claim could be alleged against GEO but held that the facts as 
pleaded in the complaint were insufficient to state a plausible claim that a 
“policy and uniform practice” of withholding necessities was occurring, 
instead granting Novoa leave to amend the complaint.119 This deviated 
from the holding in Owino and other cases, where plaintiffs’ allegations of 
“a specific punishment (solitary confinement) carried out or threatened to 
be carried out as a direct consequence for refusing to perform labor . . .
while Plaintiffs were under the exclusive control of Defendant” were suf-
ficient to state a claim.120
In each of these cases, the court of record was able to articulate how 
the conduct alleged by immigrant detainees was violative of the plain 
113. Novoa v. GEO Grp., Inc., No. EDCV 17-2514 JGB (SHKx), 2018 WL 3343494, 
at *12 (C.D. Cal. June 21, 2018) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1589).
114. Id. at *2.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at *14.
118. Id.
119. Id. at *14-15.
120. Owino v. CoreCivic, Inc., No. 17-CV-1112 JLS (NLS), 2018 WL 2193644, at 
*11 (S.D. Cal. May 14, 2018).
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language of § 1589 of the TVPA. Although the Novoa court did not al-
low the plaintiff to proceed, it acknowledged the underlying conduct, if 
sufficiently pleaded, would have likely given rise to a TVPA violation 
under the court’s analysis. In sum, the text of § 1589 has been sufficient 
for courts to allow claims to proceed and find that immigrant detainees’
claims satisfy the threshold requirements of this provision.
B. Legislative History
The defendants in these cases put forth three distinct arguments to 
assert that TVPA’s legislative history does not support its applicability in 
the immigration detention context. These arguments related to: (1) the 
appropriate scope of § 1589 in the context of appellate court precedent 
interpreting § 1584, (2) the need for trafficking or transnational conduct 
pursuant to § 1589, and (3) the applicability of § 1589 outside of the traf-
ficking context. These arguments failed to exonerate private detention 
companies from compliance with § 1589 of the TVPA; rather, the legis-
lative history indicated that forced labor in the immigration detention 
setting is within the reach of § 1589’s forced labor prohibition.
As referenced above, the defendants in these cases attempted to un-
dermine the expansive reading of § 1589 by relying on U.S. v. Kozminski
and Channer v. Hall as precedent that would cabin the reading of this 
TVPA provision. This is because Kozminski and Channer interpreted 
§ 1584 to encompass “only compulsion of services by use of physical or 
legal, as opposed to psychological, coercion.”121 As the Menocal court not-
ed, the Tenth Circuit’s analysis in U.S. v. Kaufman is persuasive.122 “The 
legislative history reveals that, in enacting § 1589, Congress sought to ex-
pand Kozminski’s limited definition of coercion under § 1584, stating that 
‘[s]ection 1589 will provide federal prosecutors with the tools to combat 
severe forms of worker exploitation that do not rise to the level of invol-
untary servitude as defined in Kozminski.’”123 Thus the plaintiffs here 
properly “argue[d] that § 1589 should not be interpreted similarly to 
§ 1584 because Congress enacted § 1589 in order to broaden the narrow 
definition of coercion adopted by the Supreme Court in Kozminski.”124
The Southern District of California came to the same conclusion, 
holding that “[h]ad Congress intended to limit § 1589 to trafficking or 
transnational crime it could have done so; indeed, other sections of the 
121. Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1132 (D. Colo. 2015) (citing 
Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988)).
122. Id.
123. U.S. v. Kaufman, 546 F.3d 1242, 1261 (10thCir 2008).
124. Menocal, 113 F. Supp. 3d at 1132.
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TVPA contain the limiting language Defendant urges the Court read into 
§ 1589.”125 In support of this assertion, the Owino court referenced 
§ 1591’s prohibition against “[s]ex trafficking of children or by force, 
fraud, or coercion,” which has “an explicit interstate or foreign com-
merce requirement.”126 The court also distinguished § 1584’s restriction 
against “[w]hoever knowingly and willfully holds to involuntary servi-
tude . . . any other person for any term, or brings within the United States
any person so held.”127 Accordingly, the court held that “[t]he lack of 
similar language in section 1589 reinforces the conclusion that there is no 
limitation on who constitutes a ‘person’ for purposes of section 1589”
and its applicability under the following circumstances.
Finally, the defendants argued that “the TVPA is inapplicable be-
cause its purpose was to prevent human trafficking, and cases exclusively 
apply the TVPA to trafficking persons for labor and/or sex.”128 In quar-
reling over § 1589, private detention companies argue that “applying the 
TVPA here would go beyond the intent and purpose of the statute, 
which was to prosecute and deter the trafficking of persons over geo-
graphic spaces.”129 The court in Owino responded by analogizing to Unit-
ed States v. Callahan, a case where “defendants argued that the TVPA’s 
legislative history was passed to combat international trafficking in human 
beings and Congress did not intend to criminalize their conduct.”130 In 
Callahan, the court found that the plain language was not limited to vic-
tims who were immigrants or sex workers, and the court could not read
in such a limitation when “the language of the statu[t]e did not include 
such a restriction.”131 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit in Barrientos “d[id] 
not find a private government contractor’s obtaining forced labor 
through actual or threatened force, restraint, or serious harm to be so far 
removed from the purpose Congress identified as to cause us to look be-
yond the plain statutory language” and did not “justify a departure from 
the principle that [the court] should give general terms their general 
meaning.”132 Thus, despite the fact the congressional findings all focused 
on the evils of trafficking in persons, because the “statute merely pro-
scribes knowingly providing or obtaining labor through defined 
125. Owino, 2018 WL 2193644 at *4.
126. Id.
127. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1584(a)(2012)).
128. Menocal, 113 F. Supp. 3d at 1132.
129. Novoa v. GEO Grp., Inc., No. EDCV 17-2514 JGB (SHKx), 2018 WL 3343494, 
at *12 (C.D. Cal. June 21, 2018).
130. Owino, 2018 WL 2193644 at *4.
131. Id. (quoting United States v. Callahan, 801 F.3d 606, 618 (6th Cir. 2015)).
132. Barrientos v. CoreCivic, Inc., No. 18-15081, 2020 WL 964358, at *8 (11th Cir. 
Feb. 28, 2020).
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means . . . [t]here is no basis for Defendant’s proposition that a federal 
detention center run by a private entity is excluded from the reach of the 
TVPA.”133
The defendants’ attempted reliance on the TVPA’s legislative histo-
ry failed them in these cases. The arguments attempted to elevate con-
gressional intent over the plain language, but even so, failed to account 
for the interpretations of these legislative findings that support the plain-
tiffs’ arguments regarding the applicability of § 1589 to the civil immigra-
tion detention setting.
C. Inapplicability of the Civic Duty Exception
The defendants in these cases also argued that the civic exception to 
the Thirteenth Amendment supported their claims and permitted immi-
grant detainees’ labor. This exception, as articulated in Butler v. Perry,
states:
[T]he 13th Amendment declares that neither slavery nor in-
voluntary servitude shall exist . . . It introduced no novel doc-
trine with respect of services always treated as exceptional, and 
certainly was not intended to interdict enforcement of those 
duties which individuals owe to the state, such as services in 
the army, militia, on the jury, etc.134
Defendants relied on the judicially-created exception to the Thir-
teenth Amendment to hold that “the federal government is entitled to 
require a communal contribution by an [immigration] detainee in the 
form of housekeeping tasks.”135 GEO cited to Fifth Circuit precedent in 
Channer to argue not only that § 1589 should be interpreted narrowly by 
drawing upon § 1584, but that the civic duty exception applied to § 1589 
as it did to the other provision within the chapter.136 However, as the 
court in Menocal found, “Defendants have cited no authority for reading a 
civic duty exception into § 1589, or for applying such an exception to a 
private, for-profit corporation under contract with the government.”137 In 
133. Novoa, 2018 WL 3343494 at *12.
134. Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332-33 (1916).
135. Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 882 F.3d 905, 912 (10th Cir. 2018) (brackets in orig-
inal).
136. Id.
137. Menocal, 113 F. Supp. 3d at 1133.
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Menocal the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the de-
fendants’ motion to dismiss.138
It is antithetical to apply the civic duty exception to non-citizens. 
Requiring individuals who are being detained in preparation for possible 
removal “from the country precisely because they are not citizens . . . to 
perform the duties of citizenship without reaping its most fundamental 
benefits” is inapposite.139 The courts’ analysis of the applicability of the 
civic duty exception was correct for two main reasons. 
First, the private corporate defendants impermissibly argued for the 
civic duty to apply, as it is a defense that only the government can invoke
and does “not apply to a contractor such as CoreCivic” or GEO.140 This 
reasoning was acknowledged by the Novoa court, which held that cases 
where the civic duty exception was recognized “had a direct government 
nexus—government service or work at government-run facilities.”141 Be-
cause CoreCivic was unable to cite “any authority that the civic duty ex-
ception can apply to a privately run facility or an instance where a court 
did so,” and given that “a private entity contracting with the federal gov-
ernment is not necessarily a federal agent,” the court held the civic duty 
exception was inapplicable.142 The Owino court came to the same conclu-
sion in deciding that the defendant could not avail itself of the “civic du-
ty exception to the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on involuntary 
servitude whereby state or federal governments could compel their citi-
zens, by threat of criminal sanction, to perform certain civic duties.”143
Citing Menocal, the court reiterated that defendants failed to put forth any 
authority that would allow the court to “read a civic duty exception into 
§ 1589, or . . . apply[] such an exception to a private, for-profit corpora-
tion under contract with the government.”144
Second, even if these corporate entities qualified as government 
agents such that they would qualify for the civic duty exception, the ex-
ception would not apply in these circumstances. The allegations of forced 
138. Ruben J. Garcia, The Thirteenth Amendment and Minimum Wage Laws, 19 NEV. L.J.
479, 499 (2018).
139. Abigail Kerfoot, Reproducing Immigration Detention (2020) (unpublished com-
ment) (on file with author).
140. Garcia, supra note 138 at 498.
141. Novoa v. GEO Grp., Inc., No. EDCV 17-2514 JGB (SHKx), 2018 WL 3343494, 
at *13 (C.D. Cal. June 21, 2018).
142. Id. (citing Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 126 (2012) as “specifically reject[ing] 
the proposition that a private prison-management firm is a federal agent like a federal em-
ployee”).
143. Owino v. CoreCivic, Inc., No. 17-CV-1112 JLS (NLS), 2018 WL 2193644, at
*6-10 (S.D. Cal. May 14, 2018).
144. Id. at *8 (citing Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1133 (D. Co-
lo. 2015).
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labor in these cases extend far beyond the situations where a civic duty 
has been recognized, such as jury duty and military conscription.145 Labor 
in the immigration detention context is not insulated by the civic duty 
exception, which distinguishes those “duties which individuals owe to 
the state from the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibitions.”146 Applying 
this exception would also ignore the facial claims asserted by the com-
plainants. As the Novoa court reasoned:
“[e]ven assuming the civic duty exception applies, Plaintiff has 
alleged he was a barber, which appears to exceed the house-
keeping responsibilities a detainee may be required to per-
form. Moreover, what duties and tasks the detainees were 
compelled to undertake and whether these assignments 
amounted to more than general housekeeping tasks are factual 
issues.”147
Accordingly, it would twist the civic duty exception past the point 
of recognition if this conduct, especially when undertaken by private ac-
tors, was found to be protected under this exception to the Thirteenth 
Amendment.
D. Appropriateness of Class Certification
The ability to file a TVPA claim as a class action suit could benefit 
the prospective plaintiffs, impact the scope of relief, and materially impact 
litigation. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 sets forth the threshold re-
quirements for a class action lawsuit and entails a showing that:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is im-
practicable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typi-
cal of the claims or defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect 
the interests of the class.148
These class certification requirements—referred to as the require-
ments for numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy, respective-
145. Novoa, 2018 WL 3343494 at *13.
146. Id.
147. Id. at *12-14.
148. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
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ly—ensure that the class claims can move forward.149 Additionally, under 
Rule 23(b)(3) a class action must satisfy two additional requirements: 
“questions of law or fact common to class members [must] predominate 
over any questions affecting only individual members” and a class action 
must be “superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently ad-
judicating the controversy.”150 Referred to as the predominance and su-
periority requirements, these additional criteria provide the final hurdle 
for claimants seeking class certification.151
The Tenth Circuit, in affirming the holding of the district court in 
Menocal, conducted a thorough analysis of class certification pursuant to 
Rule 23.152 Although GEO only challenged the commonality and typical-
ity requirements, the court did not limit its analysis to those contested 
grounds.153 The court found the commonality requirement was satisfied 
because there were common questions of law and fact, including “(1) 
whether the Sanitation Policy constitutes improper means of coercion 
under § 1589, (2) whether GEO knowingly obtain[s] detainees’ labor us-
ing [the Sanitation Policy], and (3) whether a civic duty exception ex-
empts the Sanitation Policy from § 1589.”154 As such, the class 
“[r]epresentatives have demonstrated the existence of common questions 
that can resolve issues central to the validity of its TVPA claim in one 
stroke.”155 The typicality requirement was satisfied because the class as-
serted “that GEO knowingly obtained class members’ labor by means of 
the Sanitation Policy, which threatened—or was intended to cause them 
to believe they would suffer—serious harm or physical restraint if they 
did not fulfill their cleaning assignments.”156 The class met the superiority 
requirement because individual “class members would have to overcome 
significant hurdles to adjudicate their individual claims,” would “have lit-
tle interest[ ] in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of 
separate actions,” and “the putative class members reside in countries 
149. Id.
150. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
151. Id.
152. Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 882 F.3d 905, 914 (10th Cir. 2018) (analyzing FED.
R. CIV. P. 23).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 916 (internal quotations omitted).
155. Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 320 F.R.D. 258, 265 (D. Colo. 2017) (citing Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011)).
156. Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 882 F.3d 905, 917 (10th Cir. 2018); see also Menocal 
v. GEO Grp., Inc., 320 F.R.D. 258, 264 (D. Colo. 2017) (distinguishing Wal-Mart v. 
Dukes because “GEO has a specific, uniformly applicable Sanitation Policy that is the sub-
ject of Representatives’ TVPA claim” and that “[t]his Policy is the glue that holds the 
allegations of the Representatives and putative class members together, creating a number 
of crucial questions with common answers”).
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around the world, lack English proficiency, and have little knowledge of 
the legal system in the United States.”157 Finally, the class also survived
Rule 23’s predominance requirement because “(i) the causation element 
is susceptible to generalized proof and thus cannot defeat class certifica-
tion, and (ii) individual damages assessments would not predominate over 
the class’s common issues.”158
Under this analysis, class certification was appropriate in these cir-
cumstances as the best means to vindicate the rights of the complainants 
and ensure judicial economy. This strategy also allowed the litigants to 
benefit from collective action, including the synergy of resources, to 
achieve success on the merits while promoting judicial efficiency.159
III. Impact of Thirteenth Amendment Forced Labor Litigation 
Outside of Court
These litigation efforts across the country have established new 
precedent and expanded the context in which the Thirteenth Amend-
ment is applicable. With the unparalleled expansion of immigration de-
tention, these lawsuits are key drivers of reform and should be used to in-
form and propel other advocacy efforts.
A. Legislative
There are legislative efforts on both the state and national levels that 
can complement advocacy in the courts. Currently, twenty-two states do 
not house individuals in for-profit prisons. These states, under both 
Democratic and Republican control, prohibit private, for-profit facilities. 
Additionally, three states—Nevada, Illinois, and California—passed legis-
lation in 2019 to ban for-profit facilities.160 In California alone, this legis-
lation will ultimately close three private prisons and four private deten-
tion centers, impacting over 5,400 people currently confined in those 
157. Menocal, 882 F.3d at 917 (“GEO also suggests that the class should instead seek to 
have the ICE standards relating to the Sanitation Policy ‘changed by the agency, declared 
invalid, or enjoined’. . . But such actions, even if feasible, would not provide damages 
relief and thus are not ‘superior . . . available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicat-
ing the controversy,’ especially for former detainees in the TVPA class.”).
158. Id. at 918.
159. Monique I. Madan, ICE Opposes Class-Action Suit, Says It Would Rather Litigate 
1,200 Lawsuits Instead, MIA. HERALD (May 15, 2020, 10:29 AM), https://www.miami
herald.com/news/local/immigration/article242739646.html.
160. Catherine Kim, Private Prisons Face an Uncertain Future as States Turn Their Backs on 
the Industry, VOX (Dec. 1, 2019, 3:53 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/
2019/12/1/20989336/private-prisons-states-bans-califonia-nevada-colorado.
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facilities.161 Some of these laws have faced significant public criticism and 
legal challenges. Recent legislation has faced opposition from some advo-
cates for not being sufficiently progressive and robust, while simultane-
ously facing resistance from prison companies for being overly stringent. 
For example, California’s law has been criticized as insufficiently 
robust. Advocates fear that loopholes in the California law will allow pri-
vate facilities to continue operating under the legislation’s broad carve-
outs.162 Specifically, AB 32 does not apply to: (1) “any facility providing 
educational, vocational, medical, or other ancillary services to an in-
mate,” (2) facilities that “provide housing for state prison inmates in order 
to comply with the requirements of any court-ordered population cap,”
or (3) “any privately owned property or facility that is leased and operat-
ed” by a law enforcement agency.163 The danger of these caveats is evi-
dent when compared with Nevada’s law, which prohibits “contracts with 
any private facilities that provide services like housing and custody after 
July 1, 2022, with no exemptions.”164
In addition to the shortcomings identified by advocates, California’s 
law is also being challenged in court by private prison companies who 
find the law overly restrictive. GEO Group filed suit in the U.S. South-
ern District of California alleging AB 32 would unlawfully undermine 
enforcement of criminal and immigration law.165 According to the law-
suit, “GEO has invested more than $300 million in acquiring, construct-
ing and outfitting the facilities it operates” and would stand to “lose more 
than $4 billion in capital investment and future revenue over the next 15 
years.”166 Moreover, AB 32 has been challenged by the Trump Admin-
161. Id. (citing Steve Gorman, California Bans Private Prisons and Immigration 




163. 2019 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 739 (WEST).
164. Kim, supra note 160.
165. Complaint at 1, GEO Grp., Inc. v. Newsom, 2019 WL 7373612 (S.D. Cal. 2019) 
(No. 19CV2491); Order, GEO Grp. v. Newsom, Case No.: 19-CV-2491 JLS (WVG), 
(S.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2020) (granting in part and denying in part plaintiffs’ motions for a pre-
liminary injunction, defendants’ motions to dismiss, and defendants’ motion for judgment 
on the pleadings); Associated Press, Geo Group Sues California over AB 32, Which Bans Pri-
vate Prisons, DESERT SUN (Dec. 31, 2019, 11:06 AM), https://www.desertsun.com/story/
news/2019/12/31/geo-group-sues-california-over-ab-32-ban-private-prisons/
2784752001/ [https://perma.cc/2LBT-EC8U].
166. Rebecca Plevin, 4 Things We Learned from GEO Group’s Lawsuit over Immigration 




234 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 26:1
istration in separate litigation filed by the Department of Justice, U.S. At-
torney for the Southern District of California, and other federal officials.
This lawsuit claims “that AB 32 violates the supremacy clause of the U.S. 
Constitution if applied against the federal government, contending that 
federal agencies have the power to decide how they [wi]ll house prison-
ers and detainees without interference from state governments.”167 Alt-
hough the outcome of this litigation is uncertain, efforts to curtail mil-
lions of dollars in contracts to these facilities pose a threat to the 
operations and financing of these companies.
Legislative changes adopted by states, if implemented at the federal 
level, would also be significant in curtailing incentives for private prison 
facilities in the immigration context. Yet, part of the challenge of passing 
legislative reform on either the federal or state level is the strong foothold 
that private detention companies already have in the lobbying sphere. It 
is estimated that “GEO Group and CoreCivic have spent $25M[illion] 
on lobbying over the past three decades” to increase the number of peo-
ple incarcerated within their facilities.168 They have also spent “$10 mil-
lion in support of their preferred candidates.”169 Both entities have part-
nered with coalitions like the conservative American Legislative 
Exchange Council (“ALEC”), well known for writing and promoting
model legislation focused on mandatory minimum sentences, three-
strikes laws, and ‘truth in sentencing’ legislation,” all of which have the 
effect of keeping more individuals in detention for longer periods of 
time.170 These companies have also joined to form The Day 1 Alliance,
“to rebut a growing backlash from Democratic presidential candidates 
and other industry critics.”171 The Center for American Progress reported 
that “[i]n memos to their shareholders, both companies [—GEO Group 
167. Liam Dillon, Trump Administration Sues California over Private Prison Ban, L.A.
TIMES (Jan. 25, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-01-25/trump-
administration-sues-california-over-private-prison-ban [https://perma.cc/7R73-859P].
168. Morgan Simon, GEO Group Running Out of Banks as 100% of Known Banking Part-
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CONCERNED WITH IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES (Aug. 2019), https://www.gcir.org/
resources/how-divest-immigrant-detention-philanthropic-primer
[https://perma.cc/6ZK7-XKY8].
170. Simon, supra note 168.
171. Private Prison Firms Form Advocacy Group to Rebut Scrutiny, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 
25, 2019), https://apnews.com/042884c81ec94faeb344a0b4a2fcecd7 [https://perma.cc
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and “Florida-based The GEO Group and Utah-based Management & Training Corpora-
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and CoreCivic—] acknowledge that policies with the potential to reduce 
the U.S. detainee population constitute potential risk factors to their 
business model.”172 This lobbying saturation is mirrored on the state lev-
el.173 Thus, while legislative reform would provide an important vehicle 
for reform, the extensive lobbying apparatus of the immigration deten-
tion industrial complex advocates against the interests of those in their 
care and custody, much like the private prison industry.174
B. Business Community
The private sector can also play a role in curtailing for-profit deten-
tion. First, as with many successful reform initiatives, a strong corporate 
consciousness can help increase public awareness and have a strong posi-
tive impact, even in the absence of formal government regulation. Sec-
ond, consumer activism and responsiveness can help propel businesses to 
engage in better corporate conduct by demanding transparency and ac-
tion through their spending and investments. Both of these are uniquely 
important. Because of the specific corporate and funding structure of 
most private facilities, for-profit detention companies are dependent on 
private-sector financing. Accordingly, divestment from these institutions 
can help reinforce or supplement litigation efforts to combat forced labor 
practices.
It is estimated that “3,100 companies have a financial stake in mass 
incarceration, from private healthcare providers and food service opera-
tors to well-known names like Amazon and General Electric.”175 How-
ever, limiting the financial resources of these for-profit detention compa-
nies is an important tool in curtailing their unchecked power. There is an 
important role for private businesses to play that may be informed by liti-
gation, legislative work, and community engagement on this issue, and 
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that may, in turn, influence these efforts. As GEO Group has acknowl-
edged, “losing the backing of its banking partners ‘could have a material 
adverse effect on our business, financial condition, and results of opera-
tions’ if other investors decide to ditch the industry as well.”176
Financial divestment from these for-profit detention centers must be 
part of the strategy to impact GEO and CoreCivic’s corporate structure. 
Both GEO and CoreCivic are established as Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (“REITs”) exempt from corporate income taxes.177 This business 
organization permitted GEO Group “to save an estimated $44 million in
2017 alone.”178 However, because “REITs are required by law to pass 
large portions of their incomes back to investors, limiting the amount of 
cash they have on hand[,] . . . [the companies] must rely on short-term 
loans and lines of credit, making Wall Street financing for private prison 
firms a crucial chokepoint of activists.”179
Banks including JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo, Bank of America, 
BNP Paribas, SunTrust, Barclays, Fifth Third Bank, and PNC have pub-
licly committed to ending ties with the private prison and immigrant de-
tention industry, which impacts “an estimated $2.4 [billion] in credit lines 
and term loans to industry giants GEO Group and CoreCivic.”180 Despite 
the leadership from some industry leaders, several banks—for example, 
Regions, Citizens, Pinnacle Bank, First Tennessee, and Synovus—
continue to support the industry.181 However, it is not just the banking 
industry that can exercise this influence. For instance, the California Pub-
lic Employees Retirement System (“CalPERS”), the state’s largest pen-
sion fund, divested $13.7 million from GEO Group and CoreCivic in 
October 2019 after “public employees took a stand and made their voices 
heard after learning that their retirement savings were propping up the 
very companies that have played a critical role in the migrant abuse crisis, 
as well as mass incarceration, and the school-to-prison pipeline.”182
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This is a message that investors, advocacy organizations, and other 
partners have been able to successfully champion,183 with “over 100 grass-
roots groups . . . pressur[ing] . . . banks with petitions, protests and sit-
ins, building on years of organizing by prison divestment activists.”184 If 
the current trend continues, “CoreCivic and GEO Group stand to lose 
72 percent—about $1.9 billion—of their private financing as major banks 
commit to divesting from the private prison industry under pressure from 
activists.”185 Direct divestment is only the first step, as these companies 
“are heavily invested in ‘alternatives’ to incarceration like ankle monitors 
and facial recognition technology that can extend the system of control 
and incarceration beyond the walls of a jail or detention center.”186
C. Public Education & Support
As a prerequisite to achieving changes in fiscal or immigration poli-
cy, it is necessary to inform and influence public opinion on this issue. 
Public opinion translates to community pressure, to build power within 
the electorate and influence key actors, whether they be legislators, busi-
nesses, or other partners. As discussed above, many public interest organi-
zations, including coalitions of advocacy groups, such as Families Belong 
Together, provide resources and help organize community-based cam-
paigns to create this shift.187
Recognizing recent changes in electoral power and public opinion 
is a helpful first step. For instance, acknowledging that “[t]he number of 
immigrants eligible to vote has risen 93 percent—from 12 million in 
2000 to 23.2 million in 2020,” represents a dramatic increase in ballot ac-
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cess.188 This means that in the next election, one in ten eligible American 
voters are immigrants, which is a record high.189 This power is concen-
trated—in California (5.5 million), New York (2.5 million), Florida (2.5 
million), Texas (1.8 million), and New Jersey (1.2 million)—as approxi-
mately six in ten of these 23 million naturalized citizens live in just five 
states.190 But this growth has the power to make a significant difference in 
key swing states, like Florida, where 54 percent of the immigrant eligible 
voters are Latinx.191
In addition to a changing electorate, public opinion research indi-
cates an increase in support for immigrant communities. One Pew study 
found that nearly 60 percent of Americans thought that immigrants make 
our country stronger, compared to 34 percent who believe that immi-
grants are a burden.192 However, the ability to shift opinion may exist, 
even amongst those who oppose immigration, by highlighting the bloat-
ed funding to private detention facilities, lack of government transparen-
cy, and other problematic aspects of this issue. Thus, framing and messag-
ing is important in helping to galvanize the community’s call for change.
Conclusion
This Article critically assesses the role that litigation under the Thir-
teenth Amendment can play in rectifying inequities that exist at the inter-
section of immigration, race, and labor analyzed in the immigration de-
tention context. For immigrants in detention settings, advancing 
Thirteenth Amendment litigation, pursuing legislation, and shifting pub-
lic opinion may provide a remedy.193 Ultimately, the immigration deten-
tion context represents a unique opportunity to reconcile Thirteenth 
Amendment litigation with existing case law.
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This litigation also forces us to analyze the true costs of immigration 
detention and the widespread lack of transparency and accountability that 
allows for the perpetuation of inhumane conditions that dehumanize and 
enslave vulnerable individuals in coercive settings. These are people in 
the custody of our government. If we as a society are to confine people, 
we must ensure it at least is in full compliance with the Constitution. De-
tention should not be a subsidized venture or lucrative business oppor-
tunity, especially not when it is at the expense of those whose forced la-
bor is used to pad profit margins and fund lobbying efforts to maintain 
the subjugation of their captive, low-cost workforce.
Trafficking Victims Protection Act litigation provides the mecha-
nism and framework for achieving the Thirteenth Amendment’s promise
that “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the 
United States.”194 It also provides a broad, unambiguous basis upon which 
to promulgate legislation.  The TVPA, passed by Congress in an effort to 
eliminate “all badges and incidents of slavery,” can be used to secure the 
basic rights and dignity of those incarcerated within our immigration sys-
tem. Section 1589’s text is as unambiguous as its purpose: to end all in-
voluntary labor obtained “by means of force, threats of force, physical re-
straint, or threats of physical restraint to that person or another person.”195
This litigation is not only an end unto itself, but can also help propel leg-
islation, civic activism, business consciousness, and concrete change.
Our laws do not permit a shroud of secrecy and financial exploita-
tion to shield the abuses of the immigration detention system. Thirteenth 
Amendment litigation is the necessary first step in dismantling that struc-
ture. If the detention system was forced to bear its own costs, it would 
crumble under its own weight. In the wake of both expansion and pri-
vatization of immigration detention, the Thirteenth Amendment pro-
vides the tools to prevent the ongoing use of forced labor in these facili-
ties, giving full force to the Amendment’s promise to abolish “all badges 
and incidents of slavery,” including current manifestations within the 
immigration detention system.
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